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I. INTRODUCTION
International legal process in cases of human rights abuses reflects
conflicting aspects of Americanization. One aspect is a reflection of the
American penchant for, and style in, lawsuits. Lawsuits are filed against
states and against multi-national corporations as plaintiffs seek remedies for
rights abuses. Liability is sought even for indirect involvement in causing
harm. Extensive fact-evidence submissions are made, and legal arguments
are put forward aggressively and creatively.
At the same time, the government of the United States has taken
international legal process in the opposite direction, in an effort to limit the
applicability of international law against the United States or its officials.
The United States seeks to avoid prosecution of its agents in the new
International Criminal Court. It avoids submitting itself to the complaint
procedures provided under human rights treaties. It avoids submitting itself
to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
When decisions are rendered against it in the International Court of
Justice, the United States refuses to accept them as binding, or construes
them artificially in order to evade them. In international fora, the United
States construes treaty obligations narrowly to avoid responsibility. It
declines to allow itself to be sued in U.S. courts for violation of norms found
in human rights treaties. When such cases are justiciable, U.S. courts
construe treaty obligations narrowly to sidestep those obligations.
This latter aspect of U.S. practice represents a repudiation of adjudication
to resolve rights issues. The United States, thus, is pushing the international
human rights process in both a more expansive and a less expansive direction
at the same time. This Article explores these two conflicting aspects of the
U.S. impact on international process.
II. LITIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
A feature of domestic law in the United States is a marked tendency to
resort to litigation to deal with problems that in other states are handled by
other mechanisms, or are not handled in a public way at all. This tendency is
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reflected in a generalized litigiousness in the United States, with social issues
being handled through private litigation to a greater extent than in other
states. The widespread use of malpractice insurance by professionals in the
United States, as a protection against anticipated litigation, is evidence of this
phenomenon.
On the institutional side, U.S. procedure provides for the possibility of
class-action lawsuits to deal with problems affecting groups of people. 1 This
opportunity, which facilitates suits dealing with a variety of social problems,
is not generally available in the courts of other states.2 Another procedural
mechanism that facilitates litigation in the United States is the rule that an
unsuccessful plaintiff does not typically have to pay the cost of the
defendant's attorney fees. In the United Kingdom, an unsuccessful plaintiff is
typically ordered to pay the defendant's costs, including attorney fees. 3 As a
result, potential plaintiffs in the United Kingdom must consider, before
filing, that a suit might cost them dearly, perhaps even to the point of
bankruptcy. In the United States, by contrast, an unsuccessful plaintiff may
be forced to bear some of the defendant's costs, but typically will not be
responsible for what is often the most substantial cost, attorney's fees for
defense counsel.4
For example, a group of individuals in Myanmar sued UNOCAL, a U.S.
corporation, for its construction of an oil pipeline that, according to the
plaintiffs' allegations, involved heavy-handed action by the Government of
Myanmar to get rural inhabitants out of the path of the pipeline. 5 The
plaintiffs sued for acts in violation of the law of nations, on the theory that
although a foreign government carried out the acts, the corporation facilitated
them and thus should be held responsible. 6 Even though the theory of
recovery was novel, plaintiffs could be confident that they would not bear
attorney fees if the suit failed. 7
In another example, relatives of persons who were killed in the United
States on September 11, 2001 filed suit in federal court in 2002 against one
hundred Saudi Arabian individuals, charities, and banks, on the theory that
1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2 Richard Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A
Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 217, 217-21 (1992).
3 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers, 7
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 6, 7-8 (2001).
4 See FED. R. CIv. P. 54.
5 Doe v. UNOCAL, No. 00-56603, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. Sept. 18,
2002).
6 See id.
7 See id.
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they provided financing to Osama bin Laden. 8 This suit would be highly
risky if filed in the United Kingdom, even if the evidence were sound as to
most of the defendants, since a court might well find insufficient proof that
funds from a particular defendant reached bin Laden.
Another U.S. practice that facilitates the filing of suits is the availability
of contingency fees, whereby a plaintiff surrenders to the attorney a
percentage of any recovery but pays the attorney nothing if the suit fails. The
availability of contingency fees makes it possible for an impecunious
plaintiff to sue. In most states of the world, plaintiffs bear attorney fees
regardless of the outcome of litigation.9
Still another procedure that contributes to litigiousness in the United
States is the rule of jurisdiction that allows for service of process on a
potential defendant who has little connection with the United States, so long
as that party can be served there. 10 Thus, a person who acts outside the
United States, even against non-U.S. parties, but who subsequently ventures
into the territory of the United States for a short-term visit, may be sued." 1
Suits against foreign governments for rights abuses can more readily be
filed in the United States than elsewhere because of a recent amendment to
U.S. rules on foreign sovereign immunity. Traditionally, states enjoy
immunity from suit in the courts of other states. The United States has been
prominent in carving out exceptions, however. In the mid-twentieth century,
an exception developed for instances in which a foreign state engaged in
commercial activity. 12 Congress provided for this exception by legislation. 13
Congress later provided another exception for certain torts committed by a
foreign state in the territory of the United States. 14 Congress then introduced
yet another exception, when it amended the statute on foreign-state immunity
to allow suit against a foreign state for an act of terrorism, if the state has
been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. 15 Using this exception a
number of plaintiffs have sued Iran in federal court, in one case for
8 Bob Egelko, 9/11 Families Sue Saudis, Sudan for $3 Trillion, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 16, 2002, at Al.
9 Bader Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 7.
10 FED. R. Cwy. P. 4(e).
11 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1995).
12 Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign
Governments, letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to Dep't State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Att'y Gen. (May 19, 1952) in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL., 1952, at 984-85.
13 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2003).
14 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5); see also Letelier v. Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665, 669 (D.D.C.
1980).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
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responsibility in a 1983 bombing of a U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut that
resulted in the deaths of 241 U.S. Marines.1 6
Ell. LIMITATIONS ON ADJUDICATION
The openness to suit over international claims in U.S. courts vanishes,
however, when the potential defendant is the government of the United
States. The United States has sought to insulate its own courts from treaty-
based human rights claims when it ratifies human rights treaties, by filing
declarations that such treaties are not "self-executing."'' 7 These declarations
are aimed at impairing the domestic legal effect of human rights treaties. It is
not clear whether the intent behind these declarations is to keep human rights
provisions from playing any role before the courts, or whether it is only to
avoid creating a new cause of action in the federal courts that would be based
on these provisions.
The doctrine of "self-execution" is one that the United States Supreme
Court developed in the 19th century, in implementing the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution. The Court stated that despite the apparent sweep of the
Supremacy Clause, not all treaty provisions operate as domestic law. In
particular, provisions that call for legislative action before achieving their
intended effect do not operate as domestic law. 18 However, if it appears from
treaty language that the parties intended in a particular treaty provision to
create a right, then the courts consider such a provision to have operative
effect. 19 In the 1990s, when the United States began to ratify human rights
treaties of general application, it appended declarations about non-self-
execution, but left considerable ambiguity as to the intended meaning of
these declarations. 20 Whatever the intent, the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet
construed these provisions or determined whether they have any legal effect.
The United States has also protected itself from norms of treaty-based
rights by the use of reservations. A state may, when ratifying a treaty, reserve
to provisions it deems inappropriate. 21 Extensive reservations have restricted
the applicability in U.S. courts of human rights treaties the United States has
16 U.S. Court Blames Iranfor Beirut Bombing, N.Y. Times, May 31, 2003, at A5.
17 David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INTYL. L. 129, 166 (1999)
(stating "that the United States declares that the provisions of articles 1 through 27 of the
Covenant are not self-executing").
18 Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
19 U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88-89 (1833).
20 Sloss, supra note 17, at 148-49, 158-59 (1999).
21 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331,336-37.
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ratified. Prior to U.S. ratification, the Department of Justice parses treaties in
search of provisions that might require a change in U.S. practice, then
formulates a reservation, or other language, to file along with its ratification
instrument. The United States has filed more reservations to human rights
treaties than any other state. 22
Even apart from impediments emanating from the manner of ratification,
courts in the United States have been extremely reluctant to apply human
rights provisions against the United States. In a series of cases, the United
States Supreme Court has declined to vindicate rights that appeared to be
guaranteed by treaty.
When Haitians sailing in small boats sought to migrate to the United
States in the early 1990s, the United States intercepted them on the high seas
and returned them to Haiti.23 Although many of these Haitians planned to
seek political asylum, the United States failed to inquire whether they might
be persecuted in Haiti. A court challenge was mounted to this practice on the
ground that the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees forbids a
state to return asylum seekers to their states of origin in the face of
persecution. Article 33(1) of the Convention provides: "No Contracting State
shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers or territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion." 24 At the time, this provision was effective as
domestic law in the United States, having been incorporated by Congress
into the Federal Immigration and Nationality Act.25
In its defense to the Haitians' pleas, the United States argued in court that
an obligation not to "expel or return" would arise only if the asylum seeker
entered U.S. waters, and that these individuals were intercepted on the high
seas. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, stating that the U.N. Convention did
not protect the Haitians in this circumstance. 26 This conclusion deprived the
Haitians of their guaranteed rights under the U.N. Convention, because the
Convention obligates a country to refrain from returning a person who is at
risk of persecution. The Convention does not specify that a person must enter
2 2 See, e.g., MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL;
STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2002, at 175-76, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/21 (2002)
[hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES] (detailing reservations and other limitations to
ratification of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
23 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1991).
24 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33.1, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, as incorporated in Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
25 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1999) (repealed 1996).
26 Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. at 187-88.
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national territory before the prohibition against return attaches, but simply
forbids a state party to "expel" or "return" a person at risk of persecution.
While "expel" may imply that a person is in the national territory, "return"
does not. The United States obviously "returned" the Haitians by intercepting
them on the high seas and sending them back, as was pointed out by the sole
dissenting judge of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case.27
The United States Supreme Court similarly ignored the clear mandate of
an extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico when it refused
to block the prosecution in the United States of a Mexican national.28 The
Mexican national had been kidnapped from Mexico by persons hired by the
Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States. 29 The extradition
treaty provided procedures for the surrender of persons sought on criminal
charges; it specifically allowed Mexico to refuse extradition of its own
nationals, if it so chose in a particular case. By kidnapping the Mexican
national, the United States evaded Mexico's right to refuse extradition of its
own national and its right to have surrender handled within the stipulated
extradition procedures. 30 Additionally, the United States violated the human
rights norm that protects against arbitrary detention. 31 This provision in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights32 on arbitrary detention
has been construed to forbid such international abductions. 33
U.S. courts have liberally invoked their doctrine of political question to
avoid lawsuits challenging government action. For example, a suit
questioning the congressional authorization of military action in Iraq was
dismissed as a political question. 34 In Germany, by contrast, a court sanction
is needed for the use of troops abroad. Because of a constitutional limitation
on use of German troops outside state territory, the German government was
27 H.A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39,
43-45 (1994).
28 Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
29 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657-58 (1992).
30 Id. at 672-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31 John Quigley, Our Men in Guadalajara and the Abduction of Suspects Abroad: A
Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 723, 736-38
(1993).
32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
33 Celiberti v. Uruguay, Communication no. R.13/56, Report by the Human Rights
Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 185, 188, U.N.
Doc. A/36/40 (1981); Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication no. 12/52, Report by the
Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
176, 183, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981).
34 Doe v. Bush, 322 F.3d 109, 109 (1st Cir. 2003).
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unable to send a peace-keeping force to Bosnia until it got a ruling from the
Federal Constitutional Court. 35
U.S. courts have declined to consider suits alleging violation by the
United States of humanitarian law, on the rationale that the Geneva
Conventions are not self-executing. 36 In reaching that conclusion, they have
used dubious analysis, treating the Geneva Conventions in their entirety,
rather than examining particular provisions to determine whether they are
self-executing. 37 The courts have narrowly construed their role when a
person is held, allegedly in violation of humanitarian law, at a location
outside the territory of the United States. On this basis, U.S. courts have
declined to consider suits by persons seized in Afghanistan and transported to
the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba and who are attempting to file for a
writ of habeas corpus to determine whether they are prisoners of war.38 In
declining to consider these suits, the U.S. courts rationalized that persons
other than the actual detainees could not seek a ruling on whether habeas
corpus would lie.39
IV. LIMITATIONS ON SUITS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL FORA
The United States has also protected itself from suits in international
fora. Jurisdiction before international adjudicative bodies is based on the
consent of states. States do not submit themselves generally to the process of
such bodies. Rather, jurisdiction before each such body is handled separately.
Many treaties dealing with human rights give states the option of submitting
themselves to adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory procedures. To a greater
extent than most states, the United States has refrained from submitting itself
to such procedures.
States may subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice for any breach of international law, including human rights
violations, by filing a declaration in the Court in which they agree to be sued.
35 German Government Welcomes Court Ruling on 'Out ofArea 'Missions, Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, July 12, 1994, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
36 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468-69 (4th Cir. 2003).
37 Id.; cf. United States v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791, 797-800, n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(finding a private cause of action based on the Geneva Convention and stating that
individual provisions of the Geneva Convention need to be examined to determine
whether they are self-executing).
38 Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1146-47 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Coalition of
Clergy v. Bush, 189 F.Supp. 2d 1036, 1047-49 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
39 Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2002).
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The United States filed such a declaration in 1946,40 but withdrew it in 1986,
after criticizing the Court for ruling against it in a case brought by
Nicaragua. 41 Early on at the United Nations, the United States had been a
major proponent of an international court to hear suits between states.
States may also subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice by adhering to treaties that provide for referral of disputes to
the Court in the event of treaty violations. The United States is a party to
several such treaties dealing with human rights. It has typically protected
itself, however, from possible referral of cases to the International Court of
Justice. Under such treaties, states may establish a monitoring committee,
with which aggrieved individuals may file complaints. The United States has
protected itself from being subject to such complaints by individuals.
For example, the United States is a party to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 42 but has reserved to
Article 9, which subjects a state party to suit in the International Court of
Justice at the initiation of another state party. 43 When Yugoslavia, along with
nine other NATO states, tried to sue the United States for genocide in
connection with NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia, the International Court of
Justice dismissed Yugoslavia's suit against the United States on the basis of
the U.S. reservation to Article 9.44
The United States has also ratified the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 45 but has reserved to
Article 22, which provides that disputes between states regarding compliance
are subject to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.46
Additionally, the United States has declined to file a declaration under
Article 14 of the Convention that would allow individuals to file complaints
before a monitoring committee established under the Convention. 47
The United States has ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 48 but by declaration
4 0 46-47 I.C.J. Y.B. 112.
41 U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, 86 DEPT ST. BULL.,
Jan. 1986, at 67.
42 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, T.I.A.S. 1021, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
43 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 22, at 124.
44 Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 916, 962-63 (June 2).
45 International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
46 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 22, at 139.
47 Id.
48 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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has exempted itself from Article 30, which makes disputes between states
regarding compliance subject to the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice.49 Although the United States has filed a declaration under Article 21
to allow other state parties to file complaints against it with a monitoring
body established under the Convention, it has declined to file a declaration
under Article 22 that would allow individuals to file complaints against it
with the monitoring body. 50
The United States is also a party to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 51 but it has not ratified the Optional Protocol of the
Covenant, whereby states authorize a monitoring committee established
under the Covenant to entertain complaints from individuals alleging that the
state has violated their rights. 52 Under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the United States has filed a declaration under Article 41
that allows other state parties to complain to the monitoring body, 53 but that
procedure has never been used by any state party to the International
Covenant.
The United States is a member of the Organization of American States,
but it has declined to ratify its human rights treaty, the American Convention
on Human Rights. 54 The Convention covers a full range of human rights and
establishes an Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has jurisdiction
over complaints against state parties filed by other state parties.55 Not being a
party, the United States may neither sue, nor be sued in the Court over
human rights issues.
The United States has declined to ratify two other major human rights
treaties, each of which has a committee that monitors compliance by state
parties. These are the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women 56 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.57
49 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 22, at 264.
50 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 22, at 273.
51 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
52 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 22, at 212.
53 Id. at 185.
54 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
55 Id. arts. 33, 61-62.
56 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1971, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
57 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3;
MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 22, at 283 (showing signature, but no ratification
by U.S.).
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One treaty with a human rights provision, under which the United States
is subject to international suit, is the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. 58 The United States is a party, not only to the Convention, 59 but to
an optional protocol that provides for jurisdiction in the International Court
of Justice upon a complaint filed by another state party.60 The Convention,
which regulates the status and functions of consuls, includes a clause that
gives a foreigner detained on a criminal charge a right of access to a home-
state consul for assistance in defending against the charge. The Convention
requires, in particular, that police inform a detainee of the right of access to a
consul.61
A number of foreign nationals, and their governments, have attempted to
enforce this provision against the United States, in particular in cases in
which a foreign national was not informed of the right of consular access and
was then convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death. The United
States was sued by Paraguay in 199862 and by Germany in 1999,63 in both
instances to stop the imminent execution of a national sentenced to death in
the United States. In each case, the national had not been advised of the right
to approach a consul and the Court issued an interim order asking the United
States to forego execution pending the Court's decision on the merits of the
case.64 In both cases, the United States failed to comply, and the foreign
national was executed.
Unlike most other states that are party to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, the United States has taken the position that when a
foreign national is not advised upon arrest of the right to approach a home-
state consul, a conviction and sentence of such a person remains valid.65 Also
in contrast to most other states, the United States has taken the position that
the provision on advising an arrestee creates no right that the arrestee can
58 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
59 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 22, at 102.
60 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S.
487; MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 21, at 112.
61 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 58, art. 36.
62 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v.
U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248.
63 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3).
64 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr.
9); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3).
65 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 15-17, paras.
2.11-2.15 (Jan. 21).
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enforce in the courts of the receiving state.66 Both the International Court of
Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which issued an
advisory opinion on the subject, have held that an individual's rights are
involved and that restorative action is required. 67
The United States has acted aggressively to shield its personnel from the
possibility of being prosecuted in the International Criminal Court.68 Not
only has it declined to ratify the Statute of the Court, but it has persuaded a
number of states to agree that if a U.S. national sought by the International
Criminal Court is found in their territory, they will decline to surrender the
person to the Court.69 European Union officials have complained that the
United States has put undue pressure on east European states to sign such
bilateral agreements. 70
The United States has developed its stance against the International
Criminal Court due to a concern that, since it deploys military units abroad
more than other states, its personnel would disproportionately be at risk of
being prosecuted. 7' The United States actively participated in promoting the
elaboration of the court's statute until it appeared that other states would
insist on a prosecutor's office that would not be controlled by the U.N.
Security Council, where the United States enjoys veto power. As a Security
Council member, the United States actively promoted the founding of two ad
hoc criminal courts to deal with the aftermath of conflict in Rwanda and
Yugoslavia. 72
The United States has aggressively argued inadmissibility to keep the
International Court of Justice from hearing cases filed against it, even if the
case is within the Court's jurisdiction. The Court does decline to hear cases
within its jurisdiction if it finds an impediment of another type. In Nicaragua
66 U.S. v. Nai Fook Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 2000).
67 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 513-14 (June 27); The Right to
Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process
of Law, Advisory Op. OC-16/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Ser. A) No. 16, at para. 137 (Oct. 1,
1999).
68 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
69 U.S. ICC Request Again Tests United Caribbean Front, INT'L PRESS SERVICE,
May 30, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
70 Judy Dempsey, U.S. Turns Up Heat Over World Criminal Court, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2003, at 14.
71 David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 87 (2002).
72 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
appended to S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, appended to U.N. S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
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v. U.S.A.,73 the United States argued that the Court could not adequately
ascertain the facts relevant to a situation of military hostilities and that the
Court should therefore decline to hear the case. Additionally, it argued that
the issue of war and peace is within the competence of the U.N. Security
Council, and therefore not a proper subject for adjudication in the Court,
even though the court had jurisdiction over international law issues between
the parties. The Court decided against both of these arguments and
determined that the case was admissible.74
V. STYLE OF LITIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL FORA
Even though the United States has not fully subjected itself to
international adjudication, American style has impacted the litigation style in
international courts. This has occurred through litigation in which the United
States has been a party, as well as through litigation on behalf of other states
and conducted by U.S.-based attorneys. This impact is visible, in particular,
in the International Court of Justice.
Litigation in the International Court of Justice traditionally has
emphasized the legal side of issues over the factual, although the court
functions simultaneously as a trial court and as a court of last resort. The
Court has the power to hear witness testimony, but rarely do the parties call
witnesses, limiting themselves instead to legal argumentation. 75
In three major cases, litigation led by U.S. lawyers brought fact evidence
to the Court in ways not typically seen in the Court. In the case of United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the United States gave the
Court 163 articles from the press about the hostage-taking episode in Tehran,
in support of various aspects of its claim against Iran. 76 The United States
also cited statements by its personnel demonstrating the mistreatment they
received while confined. 77
In Nicaragua v. U.S.A., both sides were represented by U.S. lawyers and
presented the court with documentary material in great volume. This
presentation of evidence was sufficiently unusual that the Court noted the
fact in its judgment of the case. The attorneys, the Court maintained,
introduced "[a] large number of documents.., in the form of reports in press
73 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility).
74 Id. at 442.
75 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 130
(1995).
76 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
77 Id. at 14.
[Vol. 19:1 2003]
HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
articles, and some also in the form of extracts from books."'78 The Court
indicated its own initial indecision on whether to entertain such evidence and
how to assess it. Noting that press reports might not necessarily be accurate,
the Court stated it would consider this material nonetheless. 79
To show a role by the United States in organizing and financing the
Contra rebel group, lawyers for Nicaragua called as witnesses a former
C.I.A. operative and a Nicaraguan who had been part of a Contra leadership
group. 80 This evidence, the import of which was sharply contested by the
United States, was central to the Court's conclusion that the United States
was responsible for various activities carried out by the Contra rebel group.81
In a case filed by Bosnia-Herzegovina against Yugoslavia over ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia, U.S. lawyers representing Bosnia-Herzegovina similarly
introduced extensive factual material to demonstrate the role of Yugoslavia
in promoting the ethnic cleansing carried out by Bosnian paramilitary units.
They also filed successive supplemental legal arguments in support of their
request for a second order on provisional measures against ethnic
cleansing.82 These filings led to a protest by lawyers for Yugoslavia of an
"unending flood of sometimes heavy documentation," and a request that the
Court strike certain of these filings.83
The Court agreed with Yugoslavia that "the submission by the Applicant
of a series of documents, up to the eve of, and even during, the oral
proceedings ... is difficult to reconcile with an orderly progress of the
procedure before the Court." However, in light of "the urgency and other
circumstances of the matter," 84 the Court decided to accept the evidence.
VI. IMPACT OF U.S. STANCE
The overall impact of the United States on the adjudication of
international rights claims is mixed. U.S. procedures encourage suit against
private parties and against foreign states. U.S. courts have seen a great deal
of litigation of international claims. Moreover, U.S. lawyers litigate
78 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 40 (June 27).
79 Id. at 41.
80 Id. at 42.
81 Id. at 63-65.
82 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia (Serb. and Mont.)), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 335 (Sept.
13).
83 Id. at 336.
84 Id. at 336-37.
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aggressively in international fora, influencing those fora to expand the ways
in which they find facts and decide the law.
However, the United States has generally refused to subject itself to
international procedures, whereby complaints may be brought against it. This
refusal has a negative impact, not only in limiting the adjudication of
complaints against the United States, but also in limiting the ability of the
United States to file complaints against other states. Moreover, since the
United States is the world's major power, its refusal to accept international
jurisdiction effects more disproportionate harm on the international system of
rights enforcement. The United States could significantly promote human
rights in the world by participating fully in the institutions that have been
created to decide rights cases.
